Justin Fox

Jay W. Lorsch

Los accionistas se quejan, con razón, de que los ejecutivos se quedan con cheques de pago asombrosos y obtienen resultados mediocres. Las juntas directivas están atrapadas en el medio, sometidas a una presión cada vez mayor para que actúen como guardianes y disciplinarios, a pesar de las pruebas de que son más eficaces como asesores amistosos.

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Reprint: R1207B 
Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle&#8212;under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they&#8217;re more effective as friendly advisers. Over many years shareholders have gained power but been frustrated by the results. Could the problem lie with them? Perhaps they aren&#8217;t really suited to being corporate bosses. 
Their role, write the authors, has been to provide money, information, and discipline. But established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. Furthermore, high-frequency traders now account for as much as 70% of daily volume on the NYSE. As for information, shareholders communicate through stock prices&#8212;but human nature dictates that we pay more attention to simple recent signals than to complex long-run trends. And shareholders have only two major disciplinary tools at their disposal: selling their shares and casting their votes. But institutional investors, which own the lion&#8217;s share of stock and have widely diversified portfolios, find it difficult to focus on the governance and performance of any one company. 
Fixing corporate governance, the authors conclude, must be about finding roles for other actors in the corporate equation who can assume some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially discipline.

What Good Are Shareholders?

Reimpresión: R1207B Los ejecutivos se quejan, con razón, de que la intromisión y las dudas de los accionistas les dificultan cada vez más hacer su trabajo de manera eficaz. Los accionistas se quejan, con razón, de que los ejecutivos se quedan con cheques de pago asombrosos y obtienen resultados mediocres. Las juntas directivas están atrapadas en el medio, sometidas a una presión cada vez mayor para que actúen como guardianes y disciplinarios, a pesar de las pruebas de que son más eficaces como asesores amistosos. Durante muchos años, los accionistas han ganado el poder, pero los resultados los frustran. ¿El problema podría estar en ellos? Tal vez no sean adecuados para ser jefes corporativos. Su función, escriben los autores, ha sido proporcionar dinero, información y disciplina. Sin embargo, las empresas establecidas tienden a financiar las inversiones con las ganancias retenidas o con dinero prestado. Además, las operaciones de alta frecuencia representan ahora hasta un 70% del volumen diario en la Bolsa de Nueva York. En cuanto a la información, los accionistas se comunican a través de las cotizaciones de las acciones, pero la naturaleza humana exige que prestemos más atención a las simples señales recientes que a las complejas tendencias a largo plazo. Y los accionistas solo tienen dos herramientas disciplinarias importantes a su disposición: vender sus acciones y emitir su voto. Pero a los inversores institucionales, que son propietarios de la mayor parte de las acciones y tienen carteras muy diversificadas, les resulta difícil centrarse en el gobierno y el rendimiento de una sola empresa. Arreglar el gobierno corporativo, concluyen los autores, debe consistir en encontrar funciones para otros actores de la ecuación corporativa que puedan asumir parte de la carga de proporcionar dinero, información y, especialmente, disciplina.

&iquest;De qu&eacute; sirven los accionistas?

Reprint: R1207B Executives complain, with justification, that meddling and second-guessing from shareholders are making it ever harder for them to do their jobs effectively. Shareholders complain, with justification, of executives who pocket staggering paychecks while delivering mediocre results. Boards are stuck in the middle—under increasing pressure to act as watchdogs and disciplinarians despite evidence that they’re more effective as friendly advisers. Over many years shareholders have gained power but been frustrated by the results. Could the problem lie with them? Perhaps they aren’t really suited to being corporate bosses. Their role, write the authors, has been to provide money, information, and discipline. But established corporations tend to finance investments out of retained earnings or borrowed money. Furthermore, high-frequency traders now account for as much as 70% of daily volume on the NYSE. As for information, shareholders communicate through stock prices—but human nature dictates that we pay more attention to simple recent signals than to complex long-run trends. And shareholders have only two major disciplinary tools at their disposal: selling their shares and casting their votes. But institutional investors, which own the lion’s share of stock and have widely diversified portfolios, find it difficult to focus on the governance and performance of any one company. Fixing corporate governance, the authors conclude, must be about finding roles for other actors in the corporate equation who can assume some of the burden of providing money, information, and especially discipline.

¿De qué sirven los accionistas?

Resumen.

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